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Abstract  
Over the 1996-2006 period, Burkina Faso has experienced a reform of its cotton sector, and has become the 
largest African cotton producer and exporter. The cotton “boom” consisted of a rapid expansion of cotton areas 
through the growth of land shares allocated to cotton (and new producers), together with an overall increase in 
total cultivated land. In this paper, we present an empirical framework to determine the contribution of total 
farmland changes in the increase of land dedicated to cotton, where both processes are represented by ordered 
endogenous variables. The empirical framework is supported by a conceptual model which takes into account 
the specific institutional features of the Burkina Faso rural cotton economy and builds upon data collected in 
rural Burkina Faso in March 2006.. From measurable indicators of farmer behavior and variables that measure 
farmer statements for the reasons of this behavior, we are able to identify both direct and indirect effects of the 
cotton reform on the extensive growth of cotton seed production. They are namely mechanization and technical 
assistance, labor intensification, enhanced managerial abilities (learning by doing and better environment for 
farmers), production incentives arising from the new local organizations of producers, guarantees and confidence 
stemming from the sector and an easier access to agricultural inputs. They all can be attributed to better 
institutional arrangements between producers and stakeholders which have been established during the reform. 
JEL Codes:  N57, 013, O33, Q15, Q18 
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Commodity Reform and Extensive Production Growth: Evidence 
from Burkinabè Cotton Farmers 
 
Over the last two decades in Sub-Saharan Africa, commodity market reforms have challenged 
many policymakers and called into question many economists. Based on the premises that 
liberalized commodity markets would have increased farmer crop profitability, which, in turn, 
would have stimulated farm investment and rural development, the dismantlement of former 
official boards and other parastatals–through the release of government controls- was 
expected to raise both commodity output and supply chain performance. Notwithstanding, 
significant increases in farm productivity have not been generally observed and the reform 
programs have exhibited mixed results. According to Jayne et al. (1997), these premises often 
failed to account for the institutional features specific to each country and each commodity. 
Major institutional constraints1 have limited the scope of newly generated benefits achievable 
through the elimination of former policy constraints to private investment incentives.  
 
In contrast to a successful top-down implementation, the development of the cotton 
economy in West Africa has been supported by millions of smallholders and by a “peasant 
cotton revolution” (Bassett, 2001). This has been induced by a rapid evolution of farming 
techniques and producers’ social organizations. Often quoted as one of the few success stories 
of agricultural development in the region, the cotton sector is now one of the economic 
growth leading factors (see Azam and Djimtoingar, 2004) and the dominant cash crop for 
farmers in the Sahel. It also represents one of the major strategies in poverty reduction for 
rural zones –as the livelihood of numerous smallholders- and the major source of cash inflows 
and export earnings for those countries (Goreux, 2003). 
 
In West Africa, the cotton sector was organized until recently in a very integrated fashion, 
with parastatals involved in input provision, ginning, and marketing. Poor economic 
performance was associated with huge financial insolvencies, poorly-managed boards, and 
high tax burden bore by producers. The reform process –where it has been undertaken- has 
been supported by changes in economic and social institutions from local to national scales. 
This has applied to the organization of markets (input sales, cotton purchases, ginning, 
marketing, input and rural credits) within a process of partial to full privatization of the 
industry and to the institutional arrangements between producers, investors and governments. 
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The liberalization process has introduced a coordination problem since cotton production 
requires a complex governance system where a number of key public goods must be 
provided: delivery of inputs, credit provision and recovery2, research and development, and 
quality grading. When new stakeholders enter the commodity chain, their benefits could be 
increased when market coordination is well achieved, yet not engaging into those activities. 
This classic collective action problem has been shown to be linked to the degree of 
competition in the African cotton sectors by Poulton et al. (2004). This is the so-called 
coordination competition trade-off. 
 
The effects of these reforms have been mixed (see Goreux, 2003), even if prices paid to 
producers have increased relative to world prices (see Baffes, 2004). Whenever unregulated 
liberalization occurred, cotton production plunged drastically after a short-term boom, caused 
by the increase in investments and new entrants. The collapse in production often occurred 
because of strong coordination failures among stakeholders, resulting in low level of public 
good provision and input credit recovery rates. This has substantially prevented farmers to 
benefit from better price incentives to invest in farm productivity. Regulatory schemes within 
a new institutional design have been established to cope with the coordination issue, as in 
Benin or in Zambia. New institutional arrangements3 have been promoted to foster market 
coordination and to set up viable input credit schemes. 
 
In Burkina Faso, the reform consisted of a new institutional design before privatizing the 
industry, including establishments of a partnership between ginneries and producers and new 
local organizations of cotton growers. The resulting large increase in repayment rates of input 
credit and more bargaining power for producers (Kaminski, 2007) led to more production 
incentives for cotton production, attracting new farmers and new land to cotton seed 
production. Burkina Faso has become the largest African cotton producer -production has 
been multiplied threefold between 2001 and 2006- partly because of the cotton reform but 
also because of the Ivorian Crisis in 2002 that resulted in a massive inflow of Burkinabè 
farmers, formerly settled in Côte d’Ivoire. However, this labor force has been oriented 
towards the cotton sector because of new incentives generated by the sector’s reform. Because 
of its focus on institutional innovations, a closer examination at the Burkina Faso experience 
would be helpful to bring some insights in the controversy about commodity market reforms. 
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In this paper, we present an empirical study of the determinants of cotton growth in 
Burkina Faso, which is supported by a survey of producers conducted in March 2006, in 
representative cotton areas. We are particularly interested in the underlying mechanisms, at 
the farmer scale, which can explain the genuine pattern of extensive growth of cotton 
production. We aim to determine to what extent the growth of cotton areas can be attributed 
to the reform of the cotton sector, and to identify producers’ incentives and changes in 
production capacities that might be involved in this growth. To this end, we estimate the joint 
probability of changes in land allocated to cotton and in total cultivated land under several 
econometric specifications. The models employed to estimate this joint probability include a 
bivariate ordered Probit with endogeneous regressors and a single-equation binary Probit. 
Comparing the performance of these competing models and undertaking specification checks 
allows us to explore the robustness of our estimation results. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is a review of the cotton reform in 
Burkina Faso with some discussion supported by interviews of officials, stakeholders, and 
national data. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy that we follow in this paper, including 
a conceptual framework for land allocation and land use, data description, and the estimation 
strategy. Section 4 discusses the main results. 
 
The cotton reform in Burkina Faso 
 
After the independence of Burkina Faso in 1960, the parastatal firm SOFITEX4 held a 
monopsony in cotton seed, and a monopoly in input provision and distribution, input credit, 
ginning and marketing cotton. Production was organized with groups of village producers, the 
GVs5, where group lending schemes established. Research and extension services were 
provided by the government, in addition to some public goods supplied by SOFITEX such as 
rural road maintenance, education, and transportation of cotton seed. Prices were posted by 
the SOFITEX every three years for the purchase of cotton seed, the sale of agricultural inputs 
and the credit interest rate. As in many countries in French-speaking West Africa, the share of 
world price given to producers remained low because of explicit or implicit taxation from 
SOFITEX and poor management performances. The system was performing well until the 
1990s because of top-quality agronomic research -with the participation of the former French 
cotton company, the CFDT- providing seeds and chemical inputs adapted to local conditions 
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and a good coordination between village groups, banks and SOFITEX. Unfortunately, an 
increasing number of weaknesses put forward the idea that there was a need for reforming the 
cotton sector. Large deficits were experienced by SOFITEX, with a decrease in the repayment 
rates of input credit from GVs and with increasing scopes of opportunities in rent-seeking 
activities and corruption among parastatal’s agents and GVs leaders6. As a result, SOFITEX 
experienced difficulties in paying producers and providing them with inputs. 
 
Before the privatization of SOFITEX, some key institutional changes have been 
undertaken. Producers have gained significant bargaining power in the management of the 
sector, and new local institutions for cotton growers have allowed the implementation of new 
attractive outgrower schemes. The former joint-liability system of GVs matched cotton to 
non-cotton growers from the same villages for their input needs but the input cost was 
deducted from the value of cotton sales. In large groups, lack of peer monitoring within 
heterogeneous groups of farmers led to opportunistic behavior and less incentives for cotton 
production. The first step of the reform consisted in replacing GVs by GPCs7, the new 
organizations of producers which were designed for cotton growers. Since 1996 in GPCs, 
producers are free to create their own group, to accept or reject new members, so that 
matching by affinities and self-selection are the core mechanisms of these new institutions. 
This design has allowed for better peer monitoring abilities and resulted in more cooperative 
behavior with more flexibility in group formation. Repayment rates have increased up to 95% 
and these organizations have continuously attracted new producers when they became 
operational after 2000.  
 
The second step of the reform was the partial privatization of SOFITEX in 1999, when 
government transferred half of its capital shares to UNPCB8, the new national union of cotton 
growers and the partial withdrawal of the government from the industry. Research and 
extension services are now held by SOFITEX and cotton unions. Then, a professional 
agreement was established between SOFITEX, banks, UNPCB and the national agronomic 
research institute. Producers were involved in management and decisions on pricing, funds for 
research and extension services, input provision, management of input credit and so on. 
Cotton unions were in charge of the provision of cereal inputs instead of SOFITEX while the 
latter focused on the delivery and credit for cotton inputs.  
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The third step of the reform began in 2002, with the entry of new investors in the ginning 
market. The goal was to attract new capital in the sector without changing the market 
organization of the sector. Indeed, the monopsonistic system was maintained with the 
definition of “concession areas” of purchasing cotton seed for each ginning firm, and 
SOFITEX retaining the major production area in the West. The Center of Burkina Faso was 
awarded to SOCOMA9 and the East to FASOCOTON10. These two new firms were included 
into the professional partnership with SOFITEX, producers, government and banks. Today, 
prices are reported and decided upon within this partnership agreement as many other 
collective decisions. Input credit is supplied by SOFITEX only for cotton inputs and by 
UNPCB for cereal inputs. The last step of the reform was to set up a new pricing mechanism. 
Prices are now posted every year, based on forecasts of the world price and are associated 
with a more transparent “smoothing” fund11, administered by the inter-professional 
partnership.  
 
According to national agricultural data12, cotton seed production had grown steadily until 
early 1990s up to 200,000 tons, due to the joint effect of a rise in productivity -improvement 
in the quality of inputs and seeds- and in cotton areas13. Because of the difficulties and the 
huge accumulated arrears faced by SOFITEX in the 1990s, there were bottlenecks to provide 
inputs to cotton growers and to pay them early after the harvest of cotton seed. As a result, 
production decreased in the 1990s until the currency devaluation14 of 1994. This allowed for a 
significant increase in the competitiveness of the cotton sector and in the payments for cotton 
growers but with an increase in imported input prices. However, the SOFITEX deficits were 
not solved and worsened due to low repayment performances of the GVs. 
 
After GVs were replaced by GPCs in 1996, the production started to increase again only 
after 1999 when input credit repayment rates became workable. This result was obtained 
because of the progressive implementation of new monitoring schemes (for input credit), 
more credible sanctions against defaulters as well as more flexible operation (self selection, 
free association of members). These elements have led to new and better incentives as 
analyzed in Kaminski (2007). The beginning of the production increase in 1999 is also the 
result of the privatization of SOFITEX with the entry of producers in its capital and the 
emergence of a strong integrated union of cotton growers. The management of the ginning 
firm has been improved and the rise of bargaining powers for producers has allowed 
increasing prices of purchasing cotton seed whereas world price of cotton declined. SOFITEX 
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met new supports from the banks to contract with new farmers and supply them with inputs, 
sustaining the beginning of the cotton “boom”. The entry of new investors in 2003 brought 
new funds for the cotton sector, therefore participating to the 15. The partnership between 
ginning firms having local monopolies and a strong integrated cotton union is significant in 
the successful implementation of the reform supported by collective decisions and 
cooperative behavior. There has been a marked empowerment of producer unions allowed by 
the timing and the design of the reform. They have benefited from the reform, taking up a 
growing number of responsibilities thanks to the emergence of their political and bargaining 
power (World Bank, 2004). 
For all involved stakeholders and for officials, the necessary condition to the reform 
success was the financial streamlining of the sector with better designed and performing 
credit schemes. The institutional shift from the GVs to the GPCs, and the new monitoring 
system set up by the inter-professional partnership between producers and ginners have been 
the crucial determinants of the higher credit repayment rates of the last crop campaigns. 
Privatization and liberalization have improved information access for producers and 
strengthened the inter-professional partnership. Some degree of confidence has emerged for 
producers with respect to cotton companies even though many contractual problems such as 
measurement errors, arbitrary quality classifications and corruption remain. With reduced or 
inexistent deficits and a sustainable credit scheme, banks have raised their commitments 
towards cotton companies, leading to more credit allowances for a growing number of 
producers16. This has also allowed producers to better access cereal inputs, so the cotton 
reform has also been beneficial to grain production and food security concerns. 
 
Research is funded by the three companies and the cotton unions, and discussed within the 
inter-professional agreement. Contributions by government have declined substantially. For 
many executives of the sector, the reform has not been associated with a better concern for 
those “critical” functions. With the withdrawal of the government from the industry, funding 
research and extension services has become more difficult with the declining cotton prices. 
Considered as commons, the delivery of these services can be jeopardized by the privatization 
process that may raise the scope of coordination failures. Supporting these activities is a key 
issue for the young inter-professional association. The withdrawal of the government has also 
led GPCs to become involved in local public goods provision. Cotton revenues were 
sometimes reinvested by the government in public goods. But for now, only the largest and 
the best managed groups can afford to subsidize local educational or health programs. 
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 Explaining the cotton “boom” requires accounting for exogenous shocks outside the 
reform process. The devaluation of the CFA Franc was responsible for the price-
competitiveness of Burkinabè cotton until late 1990s and the Ivorian crisis in 2002 led 
hundreds of thousands of people to return to Burkina Faso and, in particular, to the traditional 
cotton area in the Southwest. These two exogenous shocks can account for part of the 
production growth trend but the cotton reform appears as the decisive factor. First, the price 
transmission mechanisms from the cotton world market to producers were weak, because of a 
high –both implicit and explicit- tax burden imposed by SOFITEX. Moreover, the production 
actually decreased again at the end of the nineties. The devaluation acted as a one-shot shock 
on export prices of cotton, and cannot explain the steady increase of producers’ prices after 
1999. Second, the Ivorian crisis has been shown to be responsible to an increase of 10 % of 
the rural labor force in cotton areas (Savadogo and Sakurai, 2007) after 2002. Everything 
being equal, this would have led for over-estimating the impact of the reform of 10 % more 
after 2002 (exogenous effect). However, other covariant effects must be taken into account, 
such as the internalization of the shock by rural households in their income risk-
diversification strategy (endogenous effect). The lack of remittances brought by formerly 
expatriate Burkinabè farmers could also have influenced households to increase their cotton 
production in order to derive more cash incomes. But this would have been supported by the 
production incentives generated by the reform. Hence, we can only conjecture that the Ivorian 
Crisis turned into an amplification effect of the reform on national cotton production.  
 
Comparing the Burkina Faso experience to its neighboring countries also provides 
elements of counterfactuals. Malian cotton economy looks like the one of Burkina Faso, 
except that cotton unions have a stronger political influence and that a political status quo has 
prevailed until now. Conditions for cotton growers in Mali have not significantly changed 
during the Burkinabè reform, even when world prices deteriorated. The pattern of production 
has remained stagnating after 2000, except during cotton strikes when government tried to 
reduce producers’ price and very recently, because of more costly inputs. In Benin, cotton 
sector has been fully liberalized from 1992 with difficulties to establish adequate institutions. 
After a short-term positive effect on production, the production started to decrease rapidly 
after 2002 due to several coordination failures and the collapse of the input credit schemes. 
These are other arguments to support the reform as a decisive factor of extensive production 
growth in Burkina Faso. 
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     [Figure 1 here] 
 
The reform has not led to more intensive use of chemical inputs: pesticides and fertilizers; 
this fact is confirmed by national agricultural census and surveys (DGPSA17, INSD18). The 
cotton growth has mostly relied on area extension caused by a rapid process of mechanization 
in cotton regions and more labor allocated to this crop (see figure 1). The latter effect can be 
explained by the rise in land shares allocated to cotton, demographic growth and migration to 
cotton zones. In fact, the rise in land shares allocated to cotton in agricultural systems often 
occurs in a significant way for new or recent producers (both resident and migrants)19, which 
partly explained the overall increasing pattern of land use in favor of cotton. For some 
experts, price was not influential in land allocation choices made by farmers20. So, cotton 
areas have grown substantially because of more confidence for cotton growers in the sector 
and more –or less constrained- access to inputs. The private sector has been encouraged to 
build ginneries and provide services to farmers in regions where the parastatal company was 
not operating effectively, thus expanding the cotton producing area. 
 
Average crop yield has been stagnating around 1.05 ton of cotton seed per Ha over the 
reform period. Though it can be attributed to limited soil fertility and limited potential of the 
seed varieties, the yield variability is even more important among producers. National data 
(DGPSA for plot data) show that cotton yields have improved on the best soils, with an 
important learning-by-doing effect but that new producers cultivate cotton on marginal lands 
sometimes with under-applications of inputs. However, average input use by unit of land has 
not risen, and individual increase in cotton yield has to be associated to a better long-term 
management of soil fertility (e.g. more manure applications), and an improved planning of 
mineral fertilizer and pesticide applications. Unfortunately, soil fertility is not sufficiently 
taken into account by farmers because of a lack of land tenure security and human capital, 
according to technical agents. The positive trend of individual crop productivity is 
outweighed by the entry of less productive farmers and lands. So, only extensive growth 
factors explain aggregated cotton production: the number of producers, crop allocation 
choices, and mechanization. 
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The empirical framework 
 
To analyze the determinants of patterns in cotton areas, i.e., patterns in land use and land 
allocation among rural households, we firstly present the key specific institutional features in 
the environment of farmers in Burkina Faso. We then turn to a conceptual model of land use 
accounting for those specificities, and discuss further implications, before moving to the 
estimation strategy. 
Institutional features for land cultivation and land use in Burkina Faso 
In West Africa, not receiving land is socially unacceptable and many indigenous land tenure 
systems enable redistributing land. In Burkina Faso, there is no market for land, and land is 
more viewed as a social obligation than a material good. According to Stamm (1994), land 
rights are partially communal and partially individual, but cannot be considered neither a 
private, a public, nor a common good. Though it is almost impossible to sell or lease land, 
land can be obtainable through inheritance (in the restricted lineage), clearing of bush, gift, 
borrowing and temporary lending. The first three means of land access lead to secure rights of 
usage, and the last ones provide the so-called unsecured rights. As times goes, these rights can 
be converted in more secured ones. This is the typical way to access land for migrants. 
Temporary letting is awarded by traditional village authorities or specific land chieftaincies 
who can also take the decision upon land gifts or long-term letting. New village settlers have 
a ‘land tutor’ who directly interacts with the village chieftaincy and land owners. If the owner 
does not want to borrow the unused land, then the village chief is forced to find arable land 
for the migrant household.  
 
Several arguments in the literature can be invoked regarding the inefficiencies of such a 
land tenure system, because of a problem of misallocation of land among households and 
capital, with a limited scope of productivity gains. However, empirical evidence shows that 
land rights –as interpreted and perceived by the local population- do not matter much in the 
allocation of factors and land investment (Sawadogo and Stamm, 2000) among households, 
because local peasants, including women, do not feel insecure about their usage rights. This 
story is different from the one of Udry and Goldstein (2008) where tenure insecurity is linked 
to less land investment (fallowing) for less politically-connected villagers and women. In 
contrast, allocation inefficiency is still important within households (Udry, 1996) because 
land and input accesses for women are determined through their husband decision. 
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 Yet, Southwest Burkina Faso has been subject to high demographic pressure on land with 
population growth and migrants. Gray and Kevane (2001) showed that land scarcity has 
resulted in more land rights uncertainty and lower soil quality. Farmers have intensified their 
farming systems and adopted more conservation techniques as a strategy to secure their land 
rights and improve soil quality, but independently from their land status. However, it is not 
independent of the ethnic origin and farmers from migrant ethnic groups are willing to invest 
more in soil quality, other things being equal. This process has social costs since villagers 
who cannot access inputs such as fertilizers or manure are gradually left out the process of 
land allocation. Claims over land from non-resident ethnic group members have led to less 
fertile soils and new migrants are sometimes denied access to land. Hence, ethnic origin 
matters in the evolution of households’ cultivated land, in addition to other social and political 
considerations. 
Access to inputs –mostly fertilizers and pesticides- was managed by the GVs before the 
cotton reform, and has been undertaken by the GPCs once they have been established. While 
the former GV system helped influential farmers in the village access inputs independently 
from land allocation, the GPC system has allowed smaller free-adhesion groups formed by 
better connected individuals to gain access to inputs according to their experience and their 
land use pattern (cotton is the only cash income source to repay input credit). Accessing 
inputs does not depend anymore on social status nor on ethnic origin21 but on the overall 
management of the GPC. Migrants may have to join existing groups before creating their 
own, so they may be constrained in input access but this is only related to experience in cotton 
growing and to the length of residence in the village. Hence, ethnic origin does not matter for 
input access, and therefore for land allocation. However, the latter is constrained by the 
former. We will take into account these features when specifying the conceptual model below. 
 
Decisions about land use for rural Sahelian households are often modeled by 
lexicographic preferences according to a prior income goal and a secondary food security goal 
(see for instance, Abdoulaye and Sanders, 2006). Because some markets are missing (De 
Janvry et al., 1991) such as food or labor –and, in our case, input credit-, then production 
decisions are not separable from consumption ones in a household model representation. Let 
us now represent the problem of agricultural income maximization with risk-averse farmers 
before discussing the issue of lexicographic preferences and missing markets. 
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A conceptual model of land use under institutional constraints 
 
Consider a household h allocating farm land among K crops, i=1,2,…,K. Each crop is 
associated with a farmer-specific technology, represented by the following profit level per 
unit of land: 
( ) ,h h h hk k k k kx c lπΠ = −   , k=1,2,…,K,     (1) 
where  is random and concave, ( )hkπ i ( )1 2, , ,k k k kJx x x x= …  is a vector of J variable inputs, 
and  is the (non random) unit cost of cultivating land with crop kh hk kc l
h
k
22, assumed to be linear 
in land share . With this specification, profit is separable in variable and land costs, and the 
randomness of profit appears only through the profit component associated with variable 
costs, 
h
kl
π . 
Given total arable land Lh, the problem of the household is to determine the optimal levels of 
inputs xkj , k=1,…, K ; j=1,…, J, and land shares lk , k=1,…,K. We specify a mean-variance 
utility function of profit, such that the farmer solves: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where γ is a measure of relative risk aversion taking values on [0,1]. At the optimum, the 
constraint in (2) is binding and first-order conditions can be written explicitly for crop k, k=1, 
2, …, K: 
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where  is the variance of (.)²hkσ hkπ . These expressions show that optimal land use is sensitive 
to risk-profitability profiles of all crops, according to household specific technologies and 
input use, which in turn depend on technology, output and input prices, risk aversion and the 
effect of input use on crop profit variability. Partial differentiation of (3) reveals that land use 
and input allocation are positively correlated, that is, everything else being equal, the bigger 
the land share, the more input applied on the crop. Note that relative profitability among crops 
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matters less for land use when the total cultivated land increases, whereas input use increases 
if we assume that input use reduces profit variability. This is because the total amount of land 
increases each crop’s total profit variability. If cultivated land is very large, then optimal land 
use is only significantly affected by relative land cost and risk profiles of each crop. The latter 
is influenced by information access, price variability, marketing opportunities and risk, and 
technical knowledge. Learning processes –whether learning-by-doing or from others- 
influence the latter through interaction with technical assistants, the degree of social capital 
and neighboring effects, and own experience (Besley and Case, 1994; Conley and Udry 
2004). This can also play on the pattern of land extension when shifting from traditional to 
animal-drawn farming. 
 
These optimal solutions are obtained when there are no missing markets. However, if the 
local food or labor market is of limited scope or not well integrated into regional markets, if 
the input credit market is not developed, these solutions are not achievable. A lexicographic 
specification would basically involve that households target an income goal hV  and then a 
food security goal that can be written as a function of land share dedicated to food production. 
Once the income goal is achieved, the household tries to reach its food security one but 
possibly does not maximize income. Food self-sufficiency allocation of crops can be optimal 
(Fafchamps, 1992; Jayne, 1994). If the income goal is only achieved when the food security 
one is not, then the household allocates land and inputs so as to move closer to the latter. Note 
that cultivable land and input access may be constrained or rationed by the social mechanisms 
described above and by interlinked agreements with cotton firms. 
Because land and input access are constrained, each household has a specific food security 
goal according to its food needs, which can be expressed as a specific land share 
lhfood(Lh,xhfood,xh) where xh is the vector of total applied inputs on all crops, and xhfood  is the one 
for food crops. All these matter since total input availability is constrained by land use and 
input allocation within GPCs and total cultivable land enable households to meet their food 
requirements. With restricted input and land, the household problem becomes 
,
( , )
k kj
h
k kl x
MaxV l x  
such that  
( , ) ( , , ), , ( ),h h h h h h h h h h h h hk k food food food food food kV l x V l l L x x x x x x l L L≥ ≥ ≤ ≤; ≤ .      (4) 
 
Obviously, the food security goal is endogenous since it depends on expected agricultural 
income unless there is no food market at all. Then we obtain the following solutions:  
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*, h hk kk l l∀ = if *( , )h h h hk kV l x V≥  and  * ( , , )h h h hfood food foodl l L x x≥ h   (5) 
( , , )h h h hfood food foodl l L x x= h  if ( , , )h h h hk food kV l l x V≥  and * ( , , )h h h hfood food foodl l L x x< h  (6) 
( ) ( , , )h h h h h hfood food food foodl l V l L x x= ≤ h  if ( , , )h h h hk food kV l l x V<  and * ( , , )h h h hfood food foodl l L x x< h  
(7) 
 
Thus, land use is not only affected by available cropping land because of risk aversion and 
risk-diversification opportunities, but also because of food security reasons, land and input 
restrictions. Decisions about land use and land cultivation are not sequential, so the above 
insights support the idea that land use and allocation patterns should be jointly estimated such 
as simultaneous and endogenous processes.  
 
Let us define two vectors Xh and Yh, which are respectively vectors of all crops 
characteristics and household ones. The first one is composed by crop prices and price 
variability profiles, production risk, and cost components. The other one accounts for 
households’ crop technologies, human and farm capital, risk aversion, labor force, social 
status, cotton experience, ethnic background, and off-farm opportunities. For estimation 
purposes, we make a first-order approximation of the difference in land use among village’s 
households: 
'( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , )h h h h h h h h hk k food k k food k kl x X Y L V l l x X Y L V l D W− ≈ Δ ,  (8) 
where bars indicate averages of village characteristics, Dk is a vector of partial derivatives of 
lk with respect to characteristics, and ΔWkh is a vector of in-differences household 
characteristics such as  
[ , , , , ,h h h h h h hk k k food foodW x x X X Y Y L L V V l lΔ = − − − − − − ]
h
k
h
. 
 
Since input access and use, income and food security goals depend upon land access, 
crop and household-specific characteristics, we can rewrite (8) with endogenous cultivated 
land and land use: 
0
1
h h h h v
k k k k k
h h h h v
k k
l a X Y L
L a AX BY C l e
α β γ λ
η
⎧ = + + + + +⎪⎨ = + + + + +⎪⎩
ε
,    (9) 
where a0 and a1 are between-village averages and the regressors are both direct and indirect –
through input use and access, food security and income goals- effects (partial derivatives) of 
variation in characteristics on cultivated land and land use. λv and ηv are village fixed-effects 
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that explain between-village differences when everything is controlled for: soil characteristics, 
market connectedness, social capital, and so on. Note that the two error terms may be 
correlated, that is why a joint estimation is desirable. We are interested in the variation of land 
use and cultivated land patterns during the reform. To this end, we propose the following 
time-in-difference simultaneous model: 
0
1
h h h h v
k k k k k
h h h h v
k k
l b X Y L hk
hL b A X B Y C l u
α β γ λ
η
⎧Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +⎪⎨Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ +⎪⎩
μ
,   (10) 
where Δ(.) is the in-difference operator between 1996 and 2006, assuming constant regressors 
except for village effects23. An identification condition of the model is that one element of the 
vectors of characteristics should be present in one of the two equations and not in the other24. 
Exogeneity would be tested under the following null hypothesis: 0k kCγ = = . 
The data 
In March 2006, we interviewed 300 households of cotton producers in the South and 
Southwest of Burkina Faso. We have focused on these regions because they belong to seven 
provinces that produce 45% of total national cotton production. They have been 
heterogeneous in their production dynamics over the reform period with a different historical 
background25. Then, the cumulative production dynamics of these regions have followed the 
same pattern as the national production26.  
From this area, five zones of close ethnological and linguistic characteristics were chosen 
with four villages -two important and two of secondary one- selected in each. Farmers’ names 
were collected from updated lists of all GPCs of the village and classified into strata 
according to their cotton areas of the past crop season. Then, some households -16 in large 
villages, 14 in smaller ones- were randomly chosen in each stratum, proportionally to the size 
of the stratum. Villages were very heterogeneous in size, ethnic composition, as well as in the 
number and the experience of cotton growers between and within the five zones. Only 
households involved in cotton production, even in a marginal one, were interviewed. Indeed, 
our empirical strategy aims at explaining why cotton growers have increased their cotton 
areas. Some farmers might have abandoned cotton production and we should have tried to 
understand why, as well. However, according to national statistics, these farmers are few and 
very hard to be taken a census within villages of cotton growers. Thus, our study 
overestimates the increase in cotton areas but thus selection bias is small. Our first concern 
remains to identify the channels through which land use patterns and land cultivation have 
been modified and to get an idea about the size of effects. The selection issue is not relevant.   
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 The questionnaire was designed with retrospective questions about the evolution of 
agricultural systems and economic decisions within each household over the 1996-2006 
period. These variables were added to basic variables informing living standards, those are 
housing, education, health, consumption, credit, savings, crops, cattle. In addition to 
measurable indicators, households were asked about the reasons and the determinants of their 
choices and of the evolution of their decisions during the reform, concerning agricultural 
management. The availability of both measurable indicators of farmer behavior and variables 
that measure farmer statements for the reasons of this behavior enables us to empirically study 
a dynamic process (increase in cotton areas) with cross-sectional data. Description and 
information about the main variables are displayed in the appendix (tables 1, 2, 3). Because 
retrospective questions are inherently linked to measurement errors and recall problems, we 
use ordered variables to measure the increase in total farmland and in land shares dedicated to 
cotton. 
Estimation strategy 
Based on the insights from the conceptual model (10), these two components of the growth of 
cotton areas need to be somehow disentangled. Our dependent variables are discrete and 
ordered according to the level of increase or decrease in total cultivated land and land shares 
allocated to cotton per each household. They are estimated simultaneously by a bivariate 
Probit model. Let i, i=1,2, …, N denote the (producer) individual’s index and consider the 
general simultaneous-equation model: 
      (11) 
*
1 1 1 1 1
* *
2 2 1 2 2 2
,
,
i i i
i i i i
y x u
y y x u
δ β
δ γ β
⎧ = + +⎨ = + + +⎩
where i  are two latent variables that can be broadly defined as measures of 
profitability associated with two simultaneous decisions, and therefore are expected to be 
positive when corresponding decisions are observed. Vectors of explanatory variables 
*
1  and iy
2i
*
2y
1  and ix x  may have some common components (as in (10));  are random normal 
variables with constant variances normalized to 1, and a correlation coefficient denoted
1 and iu 2iu
ρ . 
We assume the following exogeneity restrictions apply: 1 1 ) 0,i i iE x u i2 2( ) ( iE x u= = ∀ . 
 
In our case, latent variables are associated with decisions on the extension of cotton land 
and total farmland, the precise matching of i
*
1 and i
*
2y y  to these decisions in (11) above 
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depending on assumptions made on the data generating process. We may assume that 
extension of land for cotton depends explicitly on total farmland extension given other 
explanatory variables, in which case the former would correspond to , the latter to  and 
other explanatory variables to
*
2iy
*
1iy
2ix , or the opposite. Latent variables can lie in the real line, to 
be consistent with the fact that profitability may be defined according to a set of non-
overlapping intervals, typically from large negative values to large and positive values, and 
including areas where profitability is more uncertain (around 0 in particular). Let 
{ }1[ , ] , 1, 2, , 1, 2k k kj j jS c c j k−= = …
0 , , ,  and c , ,K
k k k
J jc c k c= −∞ = ∞ ∀ ∀
* 1
1 1 21  if   an 1  ifj i ky y S y= ∈ =
;kJ
k
− ≤
d  j
= 2
j
 denote such sets, with , and such 
that . We observe the following ordered dependent 
variables: . From the structural 
model (2) and (3) we have: 
, 1,kj
j
k= ∀ =∪
1 21,2,k J=
S \
,…
1 j k ∀
  * 22 , 1, 2, , ,i ky S j J∈ = …
( )
( )
* 1 * 2
1 2
1 2
2 1
1 2
2 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
Pr ( , ) Pr ( ,
,
i j i k
j i k
j i k
j i k
ob y S y S ob j y
c x c
c x c
c x c
δ β
δ β θ
δ β
−
−
∈ ∈ = =
= Φ − − −
− Φ − − −
− Φ − − −
1 *
1 1
1 1 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 2
Pr ( ,
, ,
, ,
j i
i i
i i
ob c y c
x x
x x
x
γ β δ β
γ β δ β
γ
= ≤ <
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
( )
1 2 2
1 )j k kc y
ρ
ρ
− − <*2i c≤1
1 1
1
1 2
1
iy
θ
θ
2
1
1
1
)i k
γδ
γδ
γδ
=
−
−
−
    (12) 
( )
1 1 2 2 2
1 2
2 1 1 1 1j i kc x cδ β θ− −+ Φ − − −
(
1 1γδ − 1 1 2 2 2
,
, ,
i i
i i
x
x x
β δ β ρ
γ β δ β
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
− − ,ρ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
where )2 , ,Φ i i i
(
 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 
) ( )1/ 221 2 , γρ γ ρ θ γ−= + + = + ρ . θ
The formula for the probability of any pair (j, k) can be used to construct the log-
likelihood of the sample, and to obtain consistent Maximum Likelihood estimates of the 
bivariate ordered Probit (see Sajaia, 2007). 1 2 2J J+ −  cut off values ( ) are estimated 
together with parameters 
k
jc
1 2( , , , )β β γ ρ , but intercept terms 1 2and δ δ  are not identified 
(equivalently, cut offs are only identified up to a constant term). Parameters in the system (11) 
are identified only if exclusion restrictions are imposed, namely at least one variable in 1ix  
should be excluded from 2ix . An interesting candidate as an exogenous variable in the 
determination of total farmland evolution while not being correlated with crop allocation 
evolution -and land share dedicated to cotton- is the ethnical origin, but with experience in 
cotton growing as a control variable. This follows directly from our discussion in the 
beginning of this section. 
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A particularly interesting special case is the bivariate (binary) Probit model, which obtains 
under the restriction that . Such a restriction would be justified if, for instance, 
a single cut off value for each equation is significantly different from 0 in the bivariate 
ordered Probit model. This alternative model is considered in the following, when extension 
of land for cotton or total land farm is represented by a dichotomous dependent variable 
coded as “negative or moderate increase” versus “large increase”. Whether we consider the 
general model as the bivariate ordered Probit model, or the bivariate binary Probit 
specification, endogeneity of 
2, 1, 2kJ k= =
*
2y  as an explanatory variable in equation (11) has to be 
accounted for. If error terms  are correlated (1  and iu 2iu 0ρ ≠ ), this implies that  is 
correlated with  and therefore the second equation in the system of equations (11) cannot 
be estimated independently. In our empirical analysis of joint determination of total farm land 
and land for cotton, this endogeneity issue is indeed crucial.  
*
1iy
2iu
 
There are two ways of testing for possible endogeneity of *1y  in the equation for 
*
2y  in the 
system of equations (11) above. The first one is proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988), and 
considers separate estimation of the system (11). The method is based on a first-stage OLS 
regression of the potentially endogenous variable ( 1iy ) on exogenous explanatory variables 
( 1ix ). In the second stage, computed residuals of the first-stage regression are included in the 
Probit estimation of the second equation together with 1iy  and 2ix  as regressors. If the 
estimated parameter on predicted residuals is significant, then exogeneity of 1iy  in the second 
equation of (11) is rejected. The advantage of this testing procedure is that it only requires 
single-equation least squares and (ordered) Probit estimation steps. The second possibility 
consists in estimating the structural system of equations (10) by bivariate (ordered) Probit and 
then use a Wald Test of 0γ =  in the second one. Sajaia (2007) provides a method for 
computing this test in the bivariate ordered Probit model, with a Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood (FIML) approach. It should be noted that we do not consider, for the sake of space 
limitation, an alternative estimation method, the bivariate Probit corresponding to the reduced 
form of the system. Although this model could be employed to yield consistent parameter 
estimates as long as exogeneity of *2y  in the sense defined above is rejected, we are able to 
obtain structural parameter estimates directly by FIML with the bivariate ordered Probit 
procedure. 
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To summarize, our estimation strategy is as follows. We first consider the special case of 
the binary Probit model, where 1y  (resp. 2y ) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
corresponding land increase is large, and 0 if it is moderate or land decreases. This special 
case obtains, as described above, by restricting cut off values to 0. We then test for 
endogeneity of 2y  using the Rivers-Vuong test procedure. The binary Probit model is also 
estimated under the restriction that 0γ = , i.e., without the endogeneity issue, in a bivariate 
framework and with the same explanatory variables. Second, we turn to the estimation of the 
ordered Probit model, under its single-equation expression, and then its full structural form 
(by FIML). In the former model, we also test for the endogeneity of 2y  by extending the 
Rivers-Vuong procedure to the ordered Probit case. In the latter, FIML estimates are also 
computed under the restriction that 0γ = . For the ordered Probit, dependent variables 
correspond to multinomial variables with a wider range of possible changes in farm land 
(resp. land for cotton): large decrease, moderate decrease, no change, moderate increase, etc. 
Finally, from ordered Probit parameter estimates of the cut off values, we are able to test for 
the validity of the restricted model (binary Probit), against the alternative of the ordered 
Probit. 
Results and discussion 
 
In table 1, we observe that the sample corresponds to 0.2% of national cotton production 
of the 2005/2006 crop season. Compared to the data of DGPSA at the national level, average 
crop yields and input use are quite comparable for cotton. The variability in crop yields is due 
to the variability in mineral (chemical) and organic (manure) fertilizer application and in 
access to inputs. Moreover, there is significant variability in soil fertility and experience with 
the cotton crop (see tables 2 and 3 in the appendix). Land distribution (table 4, in the 
appendix) exhibits a similar pattern to national data of DGPSA. On average, farmers apply far 
more nitrogen on cotton than on other crops, which partly reflects the relative profitability of 
cotton with respect to other crops. It is also because input access is conditioned on growing 
cotton and input diversion to other crops has become much more difficult. However, input use 
for other crops is larger than the national average, because GPCs are now able to provide 
cereal input credit to their members. Note that the average land share dedicated to cotton is 
slightly more than 50% while it was around 30% before the reform in the same region, 
according to DGPSA. 
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 [Table 5 here] 
 
We then display descriptive statistics on our variables of interest, evolution of land shares 
dedicated to cotton and evolution of total farmland for each household in a cross-table (see 
above). Two thirds of the sample27 is composed by households who have increased their 
farmland during the reform or increased their land share dedicated to cotton and more than 
one half to households that participated to both phenomena. The correlation between these 
two variables is quite significant, which gives support to our empirical framework. 
To be consistent with the conceptual approach, we use a set of measurable household 
characteristics and related cropping behavior, and statements about evolution of farmland, 
crop risk-profitability profiles and their evolution as explanatory variables (tables 2 and 3). 
The reform period covers ten years and the answers to the recall questions may cover different 
periods of time, reflecting the farmer's particular experience. Their children may have left the 
household. Or they may have sought out land when it was more readily available. More 
established farmers might be wealthier and have different views about risk6diversification, 
income and food security goals. More to the point, the information in the left-hand-side 
variable of (7) will be different based on the length of the period covered in the retrospective 
response and may therefore represent a different relationship with the right-hand-side 
variables. To address this crucial point, we control for the age of the household’s chief and the 
experience in cotton growing. The latter also enables us to disentangle the effect of ethnic 
origin on land access as a valid instrument for the estimation strategy and to control for the 
effects of experience in land use evolution with respect to cotton growing. 
 
In the binary and ordered specifications, the exogeneity tests (Rivers-Vuong and Wald) are 
rejected for the evolution of cultivated land when estimating evolution of land use for 
allocation to cotton. That means that accounting for endogenous evolution of cultivated land 
in the evolution of land shares allocated to cotton would yield consistent estimates. In tables 
6a and 7a28, estimates are very different and reflect an endogenous bias. It is noteworthy that 
relative prices and relative price variability are not significant anymore in land use evolution 
when we account for cultivated land endogeneity. Indeed, price concerns matter less when 
cultivated land increases according to (3). Everything equal, there is a positive correlation 
between evolution of cotton shares and cultivated land, which corroborates our first findings. 
This is consistent with cash income goals once food security has been achieved. Comparing 
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tables 6a and 6b to 7a and 7b, there are more significant cut off values in the latter, so the 
ordered specification is a better specification since it is possible to disentangle different 
regimes of land use and land cropping changes. In addition, the correlation between residuals 
of the two equations is significant in the bivariate-ordered Probit specification, which gives 
support to the bivariate specification29 and to the process’ simultaneity nature. We thus focus 
on the estimates of the bivariate-ordered Probit specification (table 7a and 7b) with evolution 
of total farmland as an endogenous variable in the determination of land use evolution.  
 
    [Table 7a here] 
 
What has driven the positive evolution of cotton as a share of total farmland lies in the 
importance of better market arrangements within producers and between them and cotton 
firms, with the limitation of food needs. The date of payment cotton seed (early in the season, 
compared to other crops), the importance of accessing inputs (easier when growing cotton 
under the new GPC institutional arrangements), and the guarantee of selling all production at 
once have been crucial. They also reflect less risky strategies undertaken by farmers to fulfill 
their income goal, compared to other crops which payments arrive later in the crop season; 
marketing is more risky and involve many stakeholders with no guarantee to sell production 
at a good price, and more difficulties to access inputs. Note that technical assistance has 
limited a too large increase of cotton land use, because of more financial risks bore by the 
cotton firms while it was the reverse in the past when extension agents were sent by the 
government under a cotton-promotion national strategy. The delegation of extension services 
to the private sector is associated to a better concern with marketing profitability and financial 
risks involved in the outgrower schemes for input credit. The quality of GPC relationships is 
not significant in the evolution of land use since it has become easier to change groups for 
unsatisfied producers, therefore enabling input credit to be more equally distributed. 
 
[Table 7b here] 
 
About the evolution of total cultivated land by household, the evolution of familial labor 
force and farm capital (mechanization) appear as strong determinants. This is confirmed by 
the estimated of the mechanization dummies where already-equipped farmers have been more 
likely to increase their farmland than those who have equipped during the reform, and much 
more than those who are still cropping in a traditional fashion (with no animals). Note that the 
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increase in village labor force (release of labor shortage constraints) and better technical and 
managerial skills (input allocation and efficiency) have also significantly played on the 
general pattern of cultivated land increase. Finally, ethnic origin also explains better land 
access for resident ethnic groups than others, when experience in cotton growing and village 
residence length are accounted for. The use of ethnic origin as an instrument for endogenous 
evolution of total farmland is thus justified. 
Because the Rivers-Vuong statistics captures endogeneity and possible residual 
covariance, the estimates of univariate Probits are close to the bivariate endogenous ones. 
Note that once we controlled for all determinants, residuals are still negatively and 
significantly correlated.  To discuss the relative size of the several effects identified earlier, 
we look at the marginal effects computed on the single-equation binary Probit with the 
Rivers-Vuong estimate, which allows easier interpretations (table 8, see in the appendix). 
 
Among the several statements made by farmers, the most important effects come from the 
concern for payment date (more than 6%), followed by guarantee of selling (almost 4%), and 
input access (more than 2%) in the probability of large increase in cotton land use. The 
concern for food needs has a negative marginal impact of more than 1%. Note that an 
additional visit of a technical agent today has a negative marginal impact of 1.7% on this 
probability while it was positive before the reform (around 2%). For the probability of large 
increase in total farmland, increase in labor force (2.7%) and evolving farming system (1.7%) 
are the most important marginal effects among farmers’ statements. Indeed, already-equipped 
farmers are more likely (more than 50% more) to have experienced a large increase in 
cultivated land than non-equipped ones, while those who adopted animal-drawn farming 
during the reform have 16% more. Belonging to a resident ethnic group also increases this 
probability by 11%, traducing an ethnicity bias in land allocation. This partly confirms the 
results of Gray and Kevane (2001).  
 
Better institutional arrangements have driven the potential for cotton production in the 
region, through more incentives for land use in favor of cotton and indirect effects -through 
labor and capital investment, and better allocation of factors- for land cultivation. While 
relative prices have not significantly impacted farmers’ behavior, their institutional 
environment has generated a more secured access to inputs, and better market relationships 
with cotton stakeholders. This has substantially decreased the relative risk profile of cotton 
with respect to other crops while the increase in total farmland has secured farmers for their 
 21
food security objectives. However, the channels whereby elements of the reform have played 
on land extension remain unclear. Additional data would be helpful in this regard30. 
 
The spectrum of new difficulties faced by the Burkinabè cotton sector31 actually reveals 
that extensive cotton production is not sustainable in the long-run if cotton firms and banks 
cannot recover their loans anymore32. The new deficits experienced last years by cotton firms 
resulted in new difficulties to pay farmers (with bad agro-climatic conditions), which has led 
to a stop of the cotton “boom”33. A policy-led intensification of farming systems is expected, 
and this could be based on the same institutional mechanisms than those of the cotton reform; 
namely the involvement and empowerment of producers in the political process together with 
a sufficient degree of market coordination among stakeholders. Then, a new challenge for 
research should be the focus on the conditions for emerging institutions –both formal and 
informal- that support specific solutions to coordination problems in key commodity sectors, 
such as cotton in Burkina Faso34. This would bring new insights for agricultural policymaking 
in the region with a special interest in the institutional design of African rural societies. 
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 Appendix 
Figure 1. Cotton areas and production during the reform and experience of neighbors 
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Figure 2. Representativity of the surveyed area -Cumulative and regional production patterns 
between 1995 and 2005 
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Figure 3. Sampling area 
Source: Division Géographique du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France (Geographic Department of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample for household crop production in 2006 
 
 Observations: 300        
Cotton Total Mean Median 
Std. 
deviation Min Max 
 
National 
level 
Cotton seed output (kg) 1206266 4034.33 2373 5083.97 201 49640 710.106 
Yield (kg/ ha)  1037.17 1002 359.94 201 2073.33 1050 
Urea (kg/ ha)  68.85 50 52.13 0 533.33 62.4 
Chemical fertilizer (kg/ ha)  110.77 100 60.53 0 600 103.7 
Organic fertilizer (kg/ ha)  13.40 0 65.43 0 1000 - 
Pesticide (liter/ ha)  5.39 6 2.36 0 24 4.92 
Planted Area (ha) 1092.75 3.67 2.5 3.52 0.5 25 675.103 
Other crops        
Urea (kg/ ha)  18.32 0 34.58 0 250 7.2 
Chemical fertilizer (kg / ha)  27.17 0 52.07 0 400 12 .8 
Organic fertilizer (kg/ ha)  21.67 0 105.78 0 1600 - 
Pesticide (liter/ ha)  0.15 0 0.77 0 8.67 0.0 
Area (ha) 985.95 3.29 3 1.33 1 15 - 
Note: national data are estimates computed from the permanent agriculture survey data of DGPSA. 
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 Table 2. Description of continuous and discrete quantitative variables 
 
Variable name Description Mean SE 
Age Age of the household’s chief in years 34 8.08 
Technical  assistance 
level 
Number of visits of  technical agents in 2005/2006 2.95 5.69 
Past technical 
assistance level 
Number of visits of technical agents 10 years ago 1.95 2.84 
Risk aversion Relative risk aversion index for a harvest value of 100,000 FCFA 0.71 .021 
Off-farm income Household off-farm income (non-farm and transfers) in thousands FCFA 13.5 29.0 
Relative input Ratio of total mineral fertilizers applied on cotton/other crops by hectare 2.07 1.24 
Family labor force Importance of increase in family labor force during the reform to explain 
farmland growth35  
3.24 3.53 
Village labor force Importance of increase in village labor force during the reform to explain 
farmland growth 
2.03 2.81 
Agricultural system Importance of the evolution in agricultural system (mechanization, animal 
farming) during the reform to explain farmland growth 
3.02 3.75 
Technical abilities Importance of increase in technical abilities during the reform to explain 
farmland growth 
1.22 2.36 
Managerial abilities Importance of increase in management abilities during the reform to 
explain farmland growth 
0.94 2.14 
Relative price Importance of prices in deciding crop allocation  4.12 3.81 
Relative price 
variability 
Importance of prices fluctuations in deciding crop allocation  2.3 3.17 
Financial needs Importance of financial needs in deciding crop allocation  3.57 3.69 
Food needs Importance of food needs in deciding crop allocation  2.61 3.18 
Guarantee of selling Importance of guarantee of selling crops in deciding crop allocation  2.78 3.44 
Input access Importance of access to inputs in deciding crop allocation  2.95 2.53 
Payment date Importance of dates of crop payments in deciding crop allocation  0.36 1.49 
Technical advices Importance of technical advices by technical agents and cooperatives when 
deciding crop allocation 
0.91 2.13 
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 Table 3. Description of categorical, ordered and dummy variables 
 
Variable name Variable type and description Frequency 
Big increase in land 
share dedicated to 
cotton 
Dummy variable on the growth of land share for cotton during the reform=1 if 
the household has experienced a big increase in land share devoted to cotton 
crop  
 
 
0.423 
Significant increase 
in total farmland 
Dummy variable on farmland growth during the reform,  
=1 if the household has experienced a farmland growth more than 2 ha over 
the last ten years 
 
0.273 
Evolution of land 
shares dedicated to 
cotton 
Ordered variable on the evolution of land share for cotton during the reform,  
=1 if land share for cotton has much decreased  
=2 if land share for cotton has slightly decreased 
=3 if land share for cotton has remained constant 
=4 if land share for cotton has slightly increase 
=5 if land share for cotton has much increased 
 
0.003 
0.057 
0.183 
0.33 
0.423 
Evolution of total 
farmland by 
household 
Ordered variable on the evolution of farmland areas during the reform,  
=1 if farmland areas have decreased                
=2 if farmland areas have remained constant 
=3 if farmland areas have risen by less than two ha 
=4 if farmland areas have risen by less than three ha 
=5 if farmland areas have risen by less than five ha 
=6 if farmland areas have risen by more than five ha 
 
0.043 
0.283 
0.4 
0.127 
0.073 
0.073 
Mechanization 
system 
Categorical variable on the mechanization of agricultural systems,  
=1 if the household has adopted animal drawn farming during the reform 
=2 if the household has a traditional technology 
=3 if the household has adopted animal drawn farming before the reform 
 
0.607 
0.197 
0.197 
Cotton experience Ordered variable on the household experience with cotton growing, 
=1 if one year experienced with cotton growing 
=2 if less than three year experienced with cotton growing 
=3 if  less than five year experienced with cotton growing 
=4 if less than ten years experienced with cotton growing 
=5 if more than ten years experienced (growing cotton before the reform) 
 
0.033 
0.093 
0.143 
0.24 
0.49 
Resident ethnic group Dummy variable on the ethnical group type of the household, 
=1 if the household belongs to a resident (in contrast to a migrant) ethnic group  
 
0.603 
GPC relationships Categorical variable on the quality of relationships within the cotton group, 
=1 if good 
=2 if correct 
=3 if unpleasant 
=4 if very bad 
 
0.347 
0.55 
0.09 
0.013 
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Table 4. Evolution of total cultivated land versus present farmland 
 
 Present total farmland 
Total farmland (over the 10 last years) < 2 ha [2, 5] ha [5, 10] ha [10,15] ha > 15 ha 
Total 
number of 
households
Decreased 2 6 5 0 0 13 
Remained constant 5 49 25 5 1 85 
Has increased < 1 ha 8 59 40 10 3 120 
Has increased  [1, 2] ha 1 11 16 7 3 38 
Has increased  [2, 5] ha 0 2 8 8 4 22 
Has increased > 5 ha 0 1 6 7 8 22 
Total number of households 16 128 100 37 19 300 
 
Table 5. Evolution of total cultivated land versus evolution of land share allocated to cotton 
 
 Evolution of land share allocated to cotton 
Evolution of farmland Much 
increased 
Slightly 
increased 
Remained 
constant 
Slightly 
decreased 
Much 
decreased 
Total  
number of 
households 
Decreased 3 7 2 1 0 13 
Remained constant 23 26 30 5 1 85 
Has increased by less 
than 1 ha 
56 41 19 4 0 120 
Has increased between 
1 and 2 ha 
18 15 3 2 0 38 
Has increased between 
2 and 5 ha 
13 5 0 4 0 22 
Has increased by more 
than 5 ha 
14 6 1 1 0 22 
Total number of 
households 
127 100 55 17 1 300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6a and 6b. Binary Probit estimates of a large increase in land shares allocated to cotton and in farmland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, * is significant at 10 %, ** is significant 
at 5 %, *** is significant at 1 %. The first set of explanatory variables contains subjective ones (see the text and Tables 6 and 7 for a description of variables). The Rivers-
Vuong test is used to test for the endogeneity of a significant increase in total farmland. The Wald test statistic corresponds to the null hypothesis that the parameter associated 
with a significant increase in total farmland is not significantly different from 0. 
Large increase in total farmland Single-equation 
binary Probit 
Bivariate binary Probit 
Explanatory variables   
Family labor force .105   (.028)*** .106   (.028)*** 
Village labor force  .040   (.035) .040   (.035) 
Agricultural system  .065   (.030)** .067   (.029)** 
Technical abilities .063   (.045) .065   (.045) 
Managerial abilities .007   (.044) .009   (.044) 
Technical assistance level .024   (.014)* .021   (.013)* 
Past technical assistance level -.005   (.032) -.001   (.031) 
Adopt animal farming < 10 years .683   (.343)** .679   (.340)** 
Traditional farming reference reference 
Already animal farming (>10 years) 1.608   (.374)*** 1.592   (.372)*** 
Length of village residence -.004   (.006) -.004   (.006) 
Resident ethnic group .459    (.240)* .493   (.231)** 
Off-farm income -.001 (.003) -.001   (.003) 
Risk aversion .727 (.641) .671   (.622) 
Age .003 (.011) .003   (.011) 
New cotton grower -.580   (.685) -.493   (.694) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.663   (.528) -.724   (.502) 
Cotton experience <5 years -.842   (.326)** -.851  (.328)*** 
Cotton experience < 10 years -.093   (.221) -.083   (.218) 
Cotton grower >10 years reference reference 
Large increase in land share allocated 
to cotton 
.338    (.538) - 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -.566   (.578) - 
Constant -3.158   (.772)*** -3.014   (.726)*** 
Village effects controlled 
Wald Chi² 92.12*** 161.56*** 
Pseudo R²   .352 .239 
ρ (bivariate Probit) - -0.169   (.134) 
Observations 300 300 
Large increase in land shares 
allocated to cotton 
Single-equation 
binary Probit 
Bivariate binary 
Probit 
Explanatory variables   
Relative price  .033   (.026) .070   (.025)*** 
Relative price variability  -.042   (.031) -.062   (.030)** 
Financial needs  -.015    (.024) -.003   (.023) 
Food needs -.033   (.025) -.030   (.024) 
Guarantee of selling .099   (.030)*** .104   (.030)*** 
Input access .057   (.027)** .058   (.027)** 
Payment date .159   (.074)** .135   (.072)* 
Technical advices -.074   (.045)* -.075   (.044)* 
Technical assistance level -.044    (.014)*** -.037   (.013)*** 
Past technical assistance level  .051    (.030)* .059   (.029)** 
Relative input -.042   (.076) -081   (.075) 
Risk aversion -.349   (.450) .094   (.432) 
Age -.005   (.011) -.002   (.010) 
New cotton grower .961   (.420)** .584   (.446) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.225   (.350) -.691   (.345)** 
Cotton experience <5 years .533   (.279)** .124   (.266) 
Cotton experience < 10 years .345   (.196)* .143   (.184) 
Cotton grower >10 years reference reference 
Significant increase in total 
farmland 
1.636    (.399)*** - 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -1.782   (.431)*** - 
Constant -.551   (.883) -.648   (.924) 
Village effects and GPC relationships controlled 
Wald Chi² 71.72*** 161.56*** 
Pseudo R²    .179 .239 
ρ (bivariate Probit) - -0.169   (.134) 
Observations 300 300 
Table 7a. Ordered discrete choice models and estimates for the evolution of land shares 
dedicated to cotton over the last ten years 
 
Notes: robust standard errors are in parentheses. * is significant at 10 %, ** is significant at 5 %, *** is 
significant at 1 %. The first set of explanatory variables contains subjective ones (see Tables 6 and 7 for a 
description of variables). The Rivers-Vuong test is used to test for the endogeneity of the evolution of total 
farmland. The Wald test statistic corresponds to the null hypothesis that the parameter of the evolution of total 
farmland is not significantly different from 0. 
Evolution of land shares allocated to cotton  Single-equation 
Ordered Probit 
Bivariate Ordered 
Probit 
(FIML) I 
Bivariate Ordered 
Probit 
(FIML) II 
Explanatory variables    
Relative price  .022   (.022) .050   (.020)** .021   (.021) 
Relative price variability -.026   (.023) -.038   (.025) -.026   (.024) 
Financial needs  -.009    (.020) .005   (.020) -.006   (.020) 
Food needs -.056   (.022)*** -.053   (.021)*** -.054   (.020)*** 
Guarantee of selling .084   (.025)*** .092   (.025)*** .080   (.024)*** 
Input access .060   (.024)*** .063   (.024)*** .057   (.023)*** 
Payment date .169   (.052)*** .145   (.062)** .157   (.060)*** 
Technical advices -.065   (.038)* -.062   (.038)* -.056   (.037) 
Technical assistance level -.040    (.012)*** -.042   (.012)*** -.038   (.012)*** 
Past technical assistance level  .056    (.022)*** .062   (.028)** .054   (.027)** 
Relative input -.021   (.068) .166   (.352) -.030   (.059) 
Risk aversion -.217   (.348) -.057   (.060) -.071   (.354) 
Age -.003   (.008) .000   (.009) -.004   (.009) 
New cotton grower .583   (.473) .390   (.413) .516   (.414) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.325  (.207) -.524   (.236)** -.339   (.240) 
Cotton experience <5 years .329   (.214) .200   (.206) .295   (.206) 
Cotton experience < 10 years .010   (.175) .004   (.167) .012   (.166) 
Cotton grower >10 years reference reference reference 
Evolution of  total farmland .398    (.097)*** - .335   (.080)*** 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  -.435   (.121)*** - - 
Constant 1 -2.031   (.762)*** -2.620   (.811)*** -2.017   (.806)*** 
Constant 2 -.764   (.641) -1.370   (.739)** -.815   (.735) 
Constant 3 .253   (.643) -.371   (.733) .153   (.729) 
Constant 4 1.346 (.647)*** .675   (.734) 1.196   (.732)* 
Village effects and GPC relationships yes yes yes 
Wald Chi² 98.85*** 65.77*** 87.44*** 
Pseudo R²   .120 .198 .211 
ρ (bivariate Probit) - -.024   (.081) -.318   (.099)*** 
Observations 300 300 300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7b. Ordered choice models and estimates for the evolution of total farmland over the 
last ten years 
 
Notes: robust standard errors are in parentheses. * is significant at 10 %, ** is significant at 5 %, *** is 
significant at 1 %. The first set of explanatory variables contains subjective ones (see Tables 6 and 7 for a 
description of variables). The Rivers-Vuong test is used to test for the evolution of land shares allocated to 
cotton The Wald test statistic corresponds to the null hypothesis that the parameter of the evolution of land share 
allocated to cotton is not significantly different from 0. 
Evolution of total farmland Single-equation 
Ordered Probit 
Bivariate Ordered 
Probit (FIML) I 
Bivariate Ordered 
Probit (FIML) II 
Explanatory variables    
Family labor force .198   (.023)*** .198   (.023)*** .198   (.023)*** 
Village labor force  .095   (.028)*** .095   (.027)*** .097   (.027)*** 
Agricultural system  .122    (.025)*** .122   (.022)*** .118   (.022)*** 
Technical abilities .054   (.035) .055   (.032)* .056   (.031)* 
Managerial abilities .052   (.035) .052   (.035) .059   (.034)* 
Technical assistance level .006   (.011) .009   (.012) .006   (.011) 
Past technical assistance level -.006   (.022) -.005   (.025) -.008   (.024) 
Adopt animal farming < 10 years .557   (.189)*** .559   (.195)*** .573   (.189)*** 
Traditional farming reference reference reference 
Already animal farming (>10 years) 1.056   (.269)*** 1.062   (.234)*** 1.094   (.226)*** 
Length of village residence -.012   (.004)*** -.012   (.005)*** -.012  (.004)*** 
Resident ethnic group .468    (.171)** .469   (.165)*** .544   (.160)*** 
Off-farm income -.001   (.002) -.001   (.002) -.002   (.002) 
Risk aversion -.421   (.338) -.433   (.370) -.479   (.366) 
Age .004   (.008) .004   (.009) .004   (.009) 
New cotton grower -.109   (.372) -.115   (.375) -.116   (.375) 
Cotton experience <3 years -.075   (.243) -.059   (.262) -.040   (.260) 
Cotton experience <5 years -.163   (.212) -.162   (.216) -.158   (.215) 
Cotton experience < 10 years .215   (.169) .218   (.171) .213   (.171) 
Cotton grower >10 years reference reference reference 
Evolution of land shares allocated to cotton -.034    (.188) - - 
Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test  .023   (.201) - - 
Constant 1 -1.147   (.953) -1.012   (.448)** -0.976   (.446)** 
Constant 2 0.838   (946) .971   (.437)** .982   (.434)** 
Constant 3 2.750   (.966)*** 2.883   (.461)*** 2.888   (458)*** 
Constant 4 3.420   (.971)*** 3.554   (.472)*** 3.577   (.470)*** 
Constant 5 4.021   (.971)*** 4.155   (.486)*** 4.191   (.484)*** 
Village effects yes yes yes 
Wald Chi² 237.22*** 64.71*** 87.44*** 
Pseudo R²  .294 .198 .211 
ρ (bivariate Probit) - -.024   (.081) -.318   (.099)*** 
Observations 300 300 300 
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Table 8. Marginal effects with single-equation binary Probits and exogeneity test 
Note: robust standard errors are in parentheses, * is significant at 10 %, ** is significant at 5 %, *** is 
significant at 1 %. The Rivers-Vuong t-statistic and other control variables are included (same model as tables 6a 
and 6b). 
Large increase in land shares 
allocated to cotton 
Marginal effects in % Marginal effects in % Large increase in total 
farmland 
Explanatory variables   Explanatory variables 
Relative price  1.28   (1.01) 2.68   (.73)*** Family labor force 
Relative price variability  -1.62   (1.20) 1.02   (.91) Village labor force 
Financial needs  -.58   (.95) 1.66   (.80)** Agricultural system 
Food needs -1.28   (.97) 1.63   (1.16) Technical abilities 
Guarantee of selling 3.83   (1.17)*** .18   (1.13) Managerial abilities 
Input access 2.21   (1.06)** .61   (.37)* Technical assistance level 
Payment date 6.16   (2.87)** -.12   (.82) Past technical assistance level 
Technical advices -2.88   (1.77)* 16.30   (7.33)** Adopt animal farming < 10 
years 
Technical assistance level -1.69   (.55)*** reference Traditional farming 
Past technical assistance 
level  
1.99   (1.15)* 53.28   (12.03)*** Already animal farming (>10 
years) 
Relative input -1.63   (2.96) -.09   (1.61) Length of village residence 
Risk aversion -13.55   (17.50) 11.24   (5.56)** Resident ethnic group 
Age -.19   (.41) -.02   (.08) Off-farm income 
New cotton grower 36.11   (13.26) 18.63   (16.11) Risk aversion 
Cotton experience <3 years -8.52   (12.79) .07   (.28) Age 
Cotton experience <5 years 21.02   (10.83)** -11.18   (9.11) New cotton grower 
Cotton experience < 10 
years 
13.58   (7.72)* -12.81   (7.18)* Cotton experience <3 years 
Cotton grower >10 years reference -15.78   (4.43)*** Cotton experience <5 years 
Significant increase in total 
farmland 
58.20   (10.80)*** -2.34   (5.43) Cotton experience < 10 years 
  reference Cotton grower >10 years 
  8.86   (14.45) Large increase in land share 
allocated to cotton 
 
End Notes 
                                                 
1 They stem from institutional arrangements between producers and stakeholders and within producers, market 
institutions, and property rights. 
2 In cotton-producing Sub-Saharan areas, most farmers are cash constrained and must be financed their inputs by 
credit schemes. Because of credit market failures in rural areas, most of input credit schemes are interlinked 
arrangements between credit provision and cotton delivery. Credit recovery is challenged when several cotton 
purchasers -who are also input credit providers- can interact with farmers, because strategic defaulting on credit 
becomes more profitable and does not prevent farmers to access credit in the future. Indeed, farmers have more 
opportunities for side-selling that is, contracting for input credit to a particular credit provider and selling her 
cotton to another trader. 
3 A clearing financial house has been established in Benin to cope with input credit recovery. Because of strong 
rigidities (farmers and cotton firms have to declare whom they are contracting with and where to deliver cotton 
and inputs), private investment incentives have been weakened. In Zambia, the « distributor system » has 
promoted better relationships between technical agents and farmers’ groups, leading to better monitoring and 
credit repayment incentives. According to Brambilla and Porto (2006), this is the main cause of the cotton 
production recovery observed over these last years. This has been conditioned on the prior establishment of 
stakeholders associations and cotton producers’ groups. 
4 The National cotton fibers company. 
5 Groupements villageois. 
6 At that time, there was no efficient and transparent stabilization mechanism for prices while world prices 
declined. 
7 Groupements de producteurs de coton. 
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8 Union nationale des producteurs de coton du Burkina Faso. 
9 Société cotonnière du Gourma (owned by DAGRIS). 
10 Société cotonnière du Faso (owned by REINHARDT). 
11 This fund was previously managed by the government to subsidize the sector but has never worked efficiently; 
it is now managed by the professional partnership and its purpose is to attenuate the world price variability of 
cotton fiber. 
12 From permanent agricultural surveys (DGPSA : Direction Générale des Prévisions et  Statistiques Agricoles). 
13 This phenomenon was based on the large spread of cotton outgrower schemes with an increasing support from 
the banks to SOFITEX. 
14 In 1994, the CFA Franc was devaluated by half of its value. 
15 Between 1999 and 2006, production has continuously increased from 250,000 to 730,000 tons of cotton seed. 
16 Unfortunately, this is not true anymore because of new insolvencies and deficits from SOFITEX due to 
declining world prices, while prices paid to producers have been kept relatively high. 
17 See note 12. 
18 Institut National des Statistiques et de la Démographie. 
19 As their land share was small or non-existing before, the relative increase in land share appears as being very 
high while absolutely comparable to other cotton farmers. 
20 Above 150 FCFA, cotton supply is generally considered to be fairly inelastic. 
21 The functioning of these market-oriented village groups has been shown to exhibit no elite capture once 
elaborated governance rules have been set up (Tanguy et al., 2008).  
22 This is because of costs of soil preparation and labor with increasing marginal costs of land cultivation. 
23 This is to control for different histories in crop prices (local markets) and other social and natural 
characteristics: soil management, land tenure systems, evolution of communities and ethnic/religious 
composition, and so on. 
24 This is an instrument for the endogenous variable of the system of equations. 
25 Several provinces are part of the traditional area of production while others are recent zones of production. 
26 See figure 2 in the appendix for the production trend of each visited province where we selected villages for 
the survey. In figure 3, the location of the sampling area is shown within bold lines. 
27 Including cotton growers who started to produce cotton after 1996 (50% of the sample, see table 3). 
28 Not for tables 6b and 7b where land use evolution exogeneity is not rejected. 
29 Note that the correlation coefficient is not significant in the binary specification (tables 6a and 6b) because 
endogeneity of one of the two dependent variables is not taken into account by the bivariate binary Probit. 
30 Repeated cross-sectional data with an in-difference approach as in Brambilla and Porto (2006) would be 
helpful. It could be possible to use time-dummies for the different steps of the reform as explanatory variables 
for our system of equations (10). We suspect that larger cash incomes and better technical services have enabled 
farmers to invest more capital on land (mechanization) and to better allocate inputs, and in particular, labor 
within better managed farming systems. 
31 Arising from declining world cotton prices and increasing input prices 
32 New challenges involve the development of new technologies to improve productivities, new marketing 
strategies to build a stronger reputation of Burkina Faso’s cotton quality and to access cheaper inputs, and 
investing in research and extension services. Then, it seems clear that an interesting strategy would lie in the 
improvement of the parallel market -local and industrial textile industries- as well as the setting of an efficient 
and well-managed smoothing fund to reduce the risk arising from the world market and in new efforts to 
improve the organization of the sector. 
33 The figures of production for 2006/2007 are 660,000 tons of cotton seed reflecting the first decrease in 
production over the last ten years.  
34 A comparative study between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Benin could be interesting to understand how the local 
political economy has shaped policymaking, farmers’ cooperation, and the institutional design. 
35 All the variables described from here to the end of this table are taking values on a scale of [0, 10]. 
